Division of Labor, Gender Ideology, and Marital Satisfaction in East Asia

PWP-MPRC-2015-006
March 2015

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ABSTRACT

Using data from the 2006 Family Module of the East Asian Social Survey (N = 3,096), this article examines how marital satisfaction is affected by divisions of housework and gender ideology in four East Asian societies: urban China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Compared with Japanese and Korean married women and men, Chinese and Taiwanese spouses are more satisfied with their marriage and have more egalitarian divisions of housework, but simultaneously hold less egalitarian gender ideologies. Multivariate analyses show that relative share of housework is negatively associated with marital satisfaction for Japanese and Korean men and Korean and Taiwanese women. Egalitarian gender ideology is only significantly associated with lower marital satisfaction among Taiwanese women. Additionally, the negative association between housework and marital satisfaction is more pronounced for Taiwanese women who espouse more egalitarian gender ideologies. The authors discuss how these cross-society variations are explained by differences in macrolevel social contexts.
Division of Labor, Gender Ideology, and Marital Satisfaction in East Asia

Economic, political, and demographic transformations are occurring in East Asian societies, driven by industrialization, urbanization, and closer integration in world markets (Vogel, 1993). These forces have increased women’s educational and employment opportunities, but the gendered division of labor remains stubbornly entrenched (Oshio, Nozaki, & Kobayashi, 2013). What may have changed in East Asian societies is women’s perceptions of the fairness of unequal gendered divisions of labor and their alternatives to entering and remaining in an unsatisfactory marriage. In Western societies, unequal shares of housework reduce marital satisfaction and the negative association is stronger in countries with egalitarian norms of gender, particularly those with cultural beliefs that spouses should equally share work and family roles (Greenstein, 2009).

The diffusion of Western ideals of egalitarian partnerships that has accompanied modernization and globalization suggests that inequalities in the gendered division of labor should also reduce marital satisfaction in East Asian societies (Casterline, 2001; Cherlin, 2004; Wong & Goodwin, 2009). However, the historical cultural emphasis on familism and gender specialization in East Asian societies (Slote & De Vos, 1998) may function to normalize women’s greater and men’s lesser time investments in housework, even among egalitarian spouses, and thus remove the gendered division of labor as a source of marital dissatisfaction. In this study, we contribute to the literature on gender and family change by taking a cross-national comparative approach to investigate the independent and joint influences of the gendered division of labor and gender ideology on marital satisfaction among women and men in four East Asian societies.
Research on industrialized Western countries indicates that the gendered division of household labor and its consequences for family outcomes vary across national contexts. Women do more housework than men across the contemporary world (Sayer, 2010), but housework is more egalitarian in countries with higher levels of aggregate gender equality, full-time employment of mothers, public child care, and access to paternity leave (Fuwa, 2004; Hook, 2010; Knudsen & Waerness, 2008). A more egalitarian division of housework is associated with increased levels of perceived fairness and marital satisfaction, especially for women who espouse egalitarian gender ideologies (Coltrane, 2000; Greenstein, 1996; Lavee & Katz, 2002; Yodanis, 2010). Associations are contingent on national levels of gender equity because these provide a comparative referent used by married women in forming perceptions of justice about the division of household labor (Greenstein, 2009). National levels of gender equity are associated with public policies and organizational structures of employment and care. These affect women’s perceptions about the compatibility of work and family and thus options within and outside of marriage. Structures of employment that influence ability to harmonize work and family continue to vary across East Asian societies (Yu, 2009). Hence, we anticipate that the complex nexus of gender ideology, the gendered division of labor, and marital satisfaction should also vary across East Asian societies.

Greenstein (2009) suggests that in countries with greater gender equity in non-family (e.g., economic, educational, political, and health) domains, women are less likely to accept micro-level gender inequalities as “fair”, leading to a stronger association between gendered divisions of housework and perceptions of fairness as well as stronger associations between perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with family life. Theoretically, macrolevel gender
equity is positively associated with gender egalitarianism at home because of three mechanisms (Yu & Lee, 2013). First, women have stronger threat points and thus can bargain more effectively in relationships. Second, individuals routinely encounter women who are employed and thus it becomes normalized, particularly when mothers are employed and harms to children are thought to be minimal if any. Third, occupational opportunities for women provide pecuniary and non-material incentives for families to behave and espouse attitudes that dismiss gender specialization at home. Yet, Yu and Lee (2013) argue that higher levels of women’s integration into the public sphere may push towards greater support for gendered roles in the home. This is because people can no longer use gender differences in the public sphere to reinforce displays and ideas about essentialized gender identities, and because the costs of espousing gendered family roles seem lower. They garner support for this argument finding that macrolevel gender equality increases individuals’ support for employed mothers but decreases their support for egalitarian gender roles at home (Yu & Lee, 2013). This suggests that increased gender equity in public spheres may not translate directly into a negative association between gendered divisions of labor and marital satisfaction, because unequal shares of household work will not be perceived as unfair.

In sum, couples’ division of housework, their interpretation of that division, and consequences of that division are influenced by levels of women’s integration into public arenas (e.g., the paid labor force), specific workplace and government policies that facilitate or hinder work-family balance, and individual and cultural beliefs about masculinity and femininity. Research has yet to examine how individual-, couple-, and macro-level forces play out to shape individuals’ marital evaluation in Eastern countries, and it is this gap we fill
in the current study. Drawing on a cross-national dataset, the 2006 East Asian Social Survey (EASS), we comparatively examine the differences, for women and men, respectively, in the effects of gendered divisions of household labor and gender ideology on marital satisfaction in urban Mainland China (urban China, hereafter), Japan, South Korea (Korea, hereafter), and Taiwan. Under a cross-national comparative framework (Yu, 2015), our contribution is to systematically consider how divisions of housework and gender ideology influence the experiences of “his” and “her” marriages in East Asian contexts and explicitly assess how broader social contexts shape family outcomes.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

*Division of Housework, Gender Ideology, and Marital Satisfaction*

A rich body of literature has examined the relationships between divisions of household labor, gender ideology, and marital satisfaction, predominantly in Western contexts (for reviews, see Coltrane, 2000; Davis & Greenstein, 2009). This work finds marital satisfaction is associated with the division of housework and gender ideology, in gender-differentiated ways. In general, a more equal division of housework is associated with greater marital satisfaction, in particular for women (Coltrane, 2000). However, perceptions of equality and/or fairness in the division of household work are filtered through gender ideology, which may influence marital quality. Indeed, egalitarian gender ideology is found to be negatively associated with marital satisfaction for women, but among men the relationship is positive (Amato & Booth, 1995; Lye & Biblarz, 1993; Mickelson, Claffey, & Williams, 2006).

Institutionalist theories of marriage posit that marriages are more beneficial and evaluated as more satisfying when they correspond with cultural beliefs about women’s and
men’s roles within marriages (Sayer et al., 2011). However, because marriage is a gendered institution that affords more incentives for men to maintain specialized marital roles, egalitarian ideologies influence women’s more than men’s expectations that marriages will be partnerships of equals with similar roles and responsibilities (Sayer et al., 2011; Yodanis, 2010). At the individual level, gender egalitarian beliefs and the associations of unequal housework shares with negative evaluations of marital quality are stronger among women than men, as well as among women with more egalitarian ideologies compared to those with less egalitarian ideologies (Lavee & Katz, 2002; Wilkie, Ferree, & Ratcliff, 1998).

Cross-National Comparisons of Four East Asian Societies

The literature reviewed above is based on data from industrialized Western societies. Comparative research on divisions of household labor, gender ideology, and marital satisfaction in East Asian societies is more limited. Single-country studies indicate that women do more housework than men in the four East Asian societies we examine. Direct comparison of the size of the gender housework gap is difficult however, because the studies report on different time periods and use different measures of housework. In general, China appears to have a smaller housework gender gap, trailed by Taiwan, Korea, and Japan (e.g., see Hu & Kamo, 2007; Tsuya et al., 2005; 2012; Oshio et al., 2013).

In Western nations, individualistic and non-conformist value orientations prioritize self-actualization and individual autonomy, and equality in marital experiences is expected (Cherlin, 2009). In contrast, the four East Asian societies share a common cultural heritage in Confucianism that emphasizes patriarchy and collectivist goals (Slote & De Vos, 1998). Thus, traditional marriage in East Asia is characterized by gender hierarchy and strict arrangement
of gender marital roles (Tsuya & Bumpass, 2004). It is no surprise that East Asian men and
classify different expectations of marriage than Western counterparts (Bumpass & Choe,
2004). With the continued dominance of patriarchal family and societal structures that inhibit
full integration of women in economy (Attané, 2012; Chang & England, 2011), men are more
likely than women to endorse the male provider model and to expect the wife to take care of
home and children while viewing women’s paid work as not important (Bumpass & Choe,
2004; Jones, 2007; Lee, Tufiş, & Alwin, 2010). Violation of men’s desired marital roles is
thus likely to result in a sour outlook on their marriage (Sayer et al., 2011). Hence, we expect
that husbands’ housework share is negatively associated with their marital satisfaction.

For women, their expectations of marriage may be more ambivalent due to women’s
agency and structural and normative factors that may compete with each other. In East Asia,
progress toward gender equality in public and private arenas is largely attributable to changes
in women’s roles, rather than men’s (Frejka, Jones, & Sardon, 2010). Women are more
economically independent than before and more likely than men to expect an egalitarian
marriage (Jones, 2007). Yet, due to the difficulty that women face in combining career and
family after marriage, women usually aspire to maintain or improve socioeconomic status via
marriage and continuously depend on their husbands for financially supporting the whole
family (Raymo & Iwasawa, 2005). In addition, there is great symbolic value of the housewife
and mother role even in modern East Asian societies (Lee et al., 2010). Indeed, few Chinese
wives view their disproportionate share of housework as unfair as long as their husbands
successfully fulfill the provider role (Zuo & Bian, 2001). Thus, when wives do a larger share
of housework, we expect that this may not necessarily be associated with their lower marital
satisfaction. If this association indeed exists, we expect this relationship to be modest.

The associations between gendered divisions of housework and marital satisfaction may be moderated by national contexts. Indeed, China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan have exhibited distinct experiences of economic and cultural shifts in the last 50 years. As indicated by substantial variation in 2006 GDP per capita (see Table 1), Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are regarded as highly developed societies, while China is the only still industrializing society among these four (Chang & England, 2011). The timing of economic growth differs as well. Japan, as the world’s second largest economy, experienced rapid economic growth earliest, while substantial economic growth did not occur in China until the late 1970s. The type of economic growth has influenced macrolevel demand for women’s labor (Yu, 2009). For example, demand for women’s labor increased much more sharply in Taiwan compared with Japan because of the emphasis prior to 1970 on the development of low-skill labor intensive industry that fueled sufficient job growth to require businesses to pull women into the labor force. In contrast, in Japan, capital-intensive, high-skill industry development combined with the “permanent employment system” reduced demand for women’s labor because few new jobs were generated and tenure-graded wage scales increased incentives to push women out of employment when they married or became mothers to reduce the cost of labor (Yu, 2009). Hence, in addition to the differences in economic development levels, these four societies differ in expectations and behavior of women’s and men’s adult work and family roles.

(TABLE 1 INSERTED HERE)

Compared with the other three societies, China appears to have achieved the greatest gender equality in employment (see Table 1) and the highest level of endorsement of
women’s participation in paid work, despite it being the only still industrializing society among these four. Like most socialist states, China explicitly made gender equality a policy goal, and women’s participation in paid work was regarded as essential to the realization of gender equality (Zhou, 2004). The Party state encouraged women’s employment through the implementation of equal pay legislation and generous maternity leave (Bauer et al., 1992; Zhou, 2004). Although the Chinese state in the post-Maoist reform period has retrenched policies and ideologies promoting gender equality (Zhou, 2003; Zuo, 2014), nonetheless, most of Chinese married women are in the labor force and bring comparable wages with their husbands to the household (Attané, 2012; Oshio et al., 2013).

In contrast, a high proportion of women tend to quit jobs after marriage and particularly after childbearing in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Chen & Yi, 2005; Shirahase, 2007). The drop-off in women’s labor force participation during childbearing years is greater in Japan and Korea than in Taiwan (Tompkins, 2011; Yu, 2009). Gender inequality in the workplace is particularly pronounced in Japan and Korea. Women workers in Japan and Korea also face very similar cultural and institutional barriers to combining work and family, including emphasis on gender specialization in marriage, a culture of intensive motherhood, lifetime employment system, weak enforcement of equal employment laws, exhaustive work hours, and limited social services for childcare (Boling, 2007; Tompkins, 2011; Yu, 2009). Despite the similar institutional barriers, employment patterns are different between Japanese wives and Korean wives. Although employment has increased among Japanese mothers over the past 50 years, most have a discontinuous pattern of work after childbearing and are segregated in part-time or irregular jobs (Shirahase, 2007; Tompkins, 2011; Yu, 2009). In
contrast, Korean wives are less likely to be employed, but work much longer hours once they are employed (Choe, Bumpass, & Tsuya, 2004). Moreover, the employment hours of Korean wives vary little with the presence and ages of children (Choe et al., 2004; Oshio et al., 2013). The large difference in employment between Korean and Japanese wives is associated with the lack of part-time and flexible hour job opportunities in Korea.

In Taiwan, however, where light industries and small- to medium-size businesses prevail, women with career interruptions associated with marriage and childbearing can easily reenter well-paying jobs with relatively few penalties (Tompkins, 2011; Yu, 2009). Additionally, Chang and England (2011) report higher gender wage gaps in Japan and Korea than in Taiwan. Hence, Japanese and Korean women are less likely to be economically independent after they marry compared with Chinese and Taiwanese women. Wage structures also increase the proportion of men in Japan and Korea who earn sufficient wages to support the family on their own earnings, but decrease the proportion of men earning breadwinning wages in Taiwan and China. Hence, norms about mothers’ employment, even when young children are present, are more favorable in Taiwan and China compared with Japan and Korea (Fong, 2002; Yu, 2009).

Based on their distinct trajectories of economic growth and demand for women’s labor, we anticipate that the association between men’s and women’s housework share and their marital satisfaction varies across these four East Asian societies. In Taiwan and urban China, men do not earn enough on their own wages to support a family at the "average" standard of living, so wives’ economic contributions are more important (Yu, 2009; Zuo, 2003). In contrast, in Japan and Korea, incomes earned by husbands is more likely to meet family
needs and cultural beliefs are less favorable towards married women’s and mothers’ employment (Cooke, 2010; Yu, 2009). Thus, compared with Chinese and Taiwanese husbands, Japanese and Korean husbands who are doing a higher share of housework will have a less positive evaluation of their marriage because this violates their expectations of what marriage will be like and because it likely increases their own work-family conflict, given the long work hours demanded in Japan and Korea (Tompkins, 2011).

For women, we expect a stronger negative association between housework share and marital satisfaction in Korea and Taiwan than in Japan and China. Relative to women in the other three societies, Chinese women have limited alternatives to marriage given nearly universal marriage and low divorce rates (Jones, 2007; also see Table 1), and greater equality in the employment arena, which may create incentives to “do gender” via housework in marriage, just as Yu and Lee (2013) argue. In Japan, women view marriage and family roles as a package: the burden of housework falls overwhelmingly on the wife and the cultural belief of intensive mothering is strong and pervasive (Bumpass et al., 2009). In the context of the “marriage package” faced by Japanese women, the negative association between housework share and marital satisfaction may not be very strong among Japanese wives. In comparison, Korean wives face more barriers to gender equality in employment than Chinese wives and confront even greater work-family conflict once they are employed than Japanese wives (Choe et al., 2004; Cooke, 2010; Oshio et al., 2013). Thus, we expect that the negative association between housework share and marital satisfaction is more pronounced among Korean wives than Chinese and Japanese women. In Taiwan, women may have relatively high threat points and be able to bargain with husbands to do more housework because of the
importance of wives’ income in maintaining family standard of living and fewer penalties associated with career interruptions (Yu, 2009). Thus, Taiwanese wives’ dissatisfaction with marriage associated with their larger share of housework may result from not being able to move toward a more favorable bargain.

Empirical findings regarding associations between the division of housework and marital satisfaction in our four East Asian societies are rather mixed: a study on Japan (Tsuya et al., 2012) and one on Taiwan (Xu & Lai, 2004) report positive associations between husband’s housework share and husband’s and wife’s marital quality, but a comparative study of China, Japan, and Korea (Oshio et al., 2013) finds relative housework share is negatively associated with marital satisfaction for Korean men and women, with stronger effects among women.

Research has yet to explicitly examine if micro-level associations of housework shares and gender ideology with marital satisfaction vary across countries. National differences in economic and political institutions and gender inequalities across our four societies, in tandem with similar family systems, point to the need to address this gap in the literature. We use comparable nationally representative data from the four East Asian societies to examine the implications of the division of housework and gender ideology for marital satisfaction as well as variations across societies.

The Current Study

We adopt the “small-country-sample approach” outlined by Yu (2015), drawing on the rich literature (reviewed above) on employment and family differences in East Asia to formulate our hypotheses. Based on the evidence of positive associations between marital quality and gender equality in the division of housework in Western societies and some East Asian
societies, we hypothesize that individuals’ own relative contribution to housework is negatively associated with marital satisfaction, but because of gender beliefs and continued barriers to married women’s integration in public domains, associations between relative housework share and marital satisfaction are weaker for wives than for husbands. Because of differences across societies in family processes arising from different expectations towards family roles and gender inequality in the labor market, we further expect that housework share is more strongly associated with marital satisfaction in Japan and Korea among men and in Taiwan and Korea among women. Additionally, given the gendered effect of gender ideology on marital quality, we hypothesize that the relationship between egalitarian gender ideology and marital satisfaction is negative for women, but positive for men.

In addition to the individual main effects of relative housework share and gender ideology on marital satisfaction, gender ideology might moderate the relationship between the division of housework and marital quality, because individuals’ gender ideology functions as a lens through which inequality in divisions of household labor is viewed (Greenstein, 1996). Greenstein (1996) found that the division of household labor was more strongly associated with unfairness perceptions which were in turn related to poorer marital quality for egalitarian wives than for traditional wives. However, in East Asians contexts, if women have much lower economic autonomy than men and male participation in housework is not widely shared, whether individuals perceive divisions of housework as fair may not necessarily vary much by their gender ideology (Greenstein, 2009). Given mixed theoretical reasoning, we remain agnostic about whether gender ideology moderates the relationship between housework division and marital satisfaction.
METHOD

Data

In this study, we analyze data from the East Asian Social Survey in 2006 (2006 EASS, hereafter). Launched in 2003, the EASS is a repeated cross-sectional social survey conducted every two years by the participating institutions in China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The EASS administers questionnaires with the same core content and format in these four societies, which makes data from them largely comparable with one another. A multi-stage stratified random sampling method was used to generate a nationally representative sample of the adult population separately in each of the four societies. Currently, 2006, 2008, and 2010 data sets are public available through East Asian Social Survey Data Archive. The topical module in 2006 is about family and thus ideally suited for our analysis. It includes information on respondents’ gender ideology and marital satisfaction as well as respondents’ and current spouses’ frequencies of doing household tasks and sociodemographic characteristics. The original sample size (response rate) is 3,208 (38.5%), 2,130 (59.8%), 1,605 (65.7%), and 2,102 (41.8%) for China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, respectively.

Because we examine marital satisfaction, we limit our sample to respondents who are currently married ($N = 6,438$). We further limit the sample to married adults in which both spouses are in their prime working ages (i.e., between the ages of 25 and 54; $N = 3,957$) and in which at least one spouse is employed ($N = 3,906$). Because of our focus on the implications of divisions of labor for marital satisfaction, this sample definition allows us to examine adults in marriages where spousal negotiations of paid and unpaid work are most likely to occur. Additionally, we limit the Chinese sample to respondents living in urban
China \((N = 1,154\) out of 1,757\) for two reasons. First, in the Chinese survey, weekly work hours were not surveyed among respondents living in rural areas. Therefore, we lack essential information to create our measure of division of paid work. Second, urban China is also more comparable to the other three societies in terms of socioeconomic development. We drop 197 respondents with missing data \((6.27\%)\) yielding an analytic sample of 3,096 respondents, with 1,085 Chinese from urban areas, 571 Japanese, 709 Koreans, and 731 Taiwanese.

Our data report only currently married individuals’ information on marital satisfaction and spousal characteristics. To the extent that the least satisfied couples dissolved their marriage before the survey, selection bias may occur. However, selection arising from marital dissolution, if any, is not likely to bias our results because only 3.89 percent of respondents ages 25 to 54 from the four societies were separated or divorced, with society-specific percentage ranging from 2.34\% for the Chinese sample to 5.60\% for the Japanese sample (also see Table 1 for crude divorce rates). Our confidence that bias is likely minimal is bolstered by Lee and Ono’s (2008) finding of no significant selection bias among Japanese couples in their study.

**Measures**

The dependent variable is a single-item measure for marital satisfaction. It is created from responses to the following question on a five-point scale: “Considering all things together, how would you describe your marriage? Would you say that you are very satisfied or dissatisfied with your marriage?” As shown in Table 2, marital satisfaction has a very skewed distribution; similar to reports of marital satisfaction among Western country respondents. We combine the lowest two categories of marital satisfaction because very few married people,
less than 3% for both man and women within each society, report being very dissatisfied with their current marriages.

The main variables of interest are the division of housework and gender ideology. We first describe our measure of housework. The 2006 EASS asked respondents how often they and their spouses prepared evening meals, did laundry, and cleaned the house, respectively. Respondents answered from seven options: almost every day, several times a week, about once a week, about once a month, several times a year, about once a year, and never. These three household tasks are everyday routine housework that is the most time-consuming, in contrast to more discretionary household tasks such as yard work or repairs (Coltrane, 2000). Also, because housework tasks surveyed in the 2006 EASS are feminine-typed, we may overestimate women’s share of housework and underestimate men’s. In addition, time in childcare activities is not explicitly included in our measure of unpaid labor. Although we might underestimate men’s share of unpaid labor because men are more involved in caring for children than doing housework, the non-inclusion of child care is theoretically better because the theoretical perspectives that have been useful in studying housework are usually more difficult to apply to gender divisions of child care (Bianchi et al. 2012).

Respondents reported their own and their spouses’ frequencies of doing household tasks. We weight each category to represent how many days a week, on average, individuals cook evening meals, do laundry, or clean (see Oshio et al., 2013). We then take the mean value for the three household tasks, and calculate the share of the respondent’s frequency relative to the couple’s combined housework frequency. We control for the couple’s absolute frequency of housework, but focus on a relative housework measure because of its conceptual
correspondence with how housework is distributed between couples, and thus subjective evaluations of housework fairness (Greenstein, 2000). Sayer (2010) also shows that the gender gap in housework is affected by country-level variation in gender empowerment, whereas absolute levels of housework vary more by country-specific models of cleanliness.

We construct the relative share of household labor for men and women separately, meaning that for a married male (female) respondent, we use his (her) self-reported housework frequency divided by the sum of his (her) self-reported housework frequency and his (her) reports of his wife’s (her husband’s) housework frequency. Thus, within each society, the sum of men’s average share and women’s average share does not necessarily equal 100. Reporting bias might arise because respondents, men in particular, overestimate the time they spend on housework and underestimate spouse’s housework time (Shelton & John, 1996). However, we expect the bias, if any, is likely modest since the questions asked the frequency instead of the exact hours of doing housework.

The other key variable is gender ideology. Gender ideology is an “underlying concept of an individual’s level of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities that is based on the notion of separate spheres (Davis & Greenstein, 2009).” We measure gender ideology through two items. The original wordings for the two items are as follows: 1) It is more important for a wife to help her husband’s career than to pursue her own career; and 2) A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family. The responses are on a seven-point scale, with 1 representing strongly agree and 7 representing strongly disagree. Factor analysis shows that the two items reflect a single underlying concept (Rust & Golombok, 2009). The Cronbach’s alpha of the two items for each society-gender
group ranges from 0.65 (for Taiwanese men) to 0.80 (for Japanese men), indicating good reliability. Thus, a gender ideology scale, ranging from one to seven, is created by averaging the two items, with higher scores indicating more egalitarian gender ideology.

To account for possible confounders associated with both marital satisfaction and the division of housework, we control for divisions of paid work, respondent’s sociodemographic characteristics, family socioeconomic status, and presence of children and parents or in-laws. The division of housework is likely to influence marital satisfaction through perceptions of fairness (Greenstein, 1996). However, individuals’ perceived fairness of the division of housework is also influenced by couple’s divisions of paid work (Coltrane, 2000). Therefore, we control for the respondent’s share of the couple’s total weekly employment hours.

Respondent’s characteristics include age, education, and health. Age, measured in years, is included because both marital quality and the gendered division of housework change over the life course (Coltrane, 2000; Umberson et al., 2006). Educational attainment is correlated with higher marital quality and a more egalitarian division of housework (Amato et al., 2003; Coltrane, 2000). We measure education through three dummy variables: less than high school, high school (reference category), and college or above. Respondents’ self-rated health status implies their ability to do housework and has a reciprocal relationship with marital quality (Umberson et al., 2006). Self-rated health status was measured on 5-point scale ranging from very good to very bad. We recode the original scale into a dichotomous variable, with the value 1 representing very good or good health.

Prior work identifies strong but inconsistent influences of individual and family income on housework (see Cooke & Baxter, 2010 for a review). We use a measure of relative
economic status instead of an absolute measure because of substantial missing data on household income, ranging from less than 1% in Korea to more than 20% in Japan, and lack of comparability of income measures across the four societies (i.e., continuous measures in Chinese and Korean surveys, but ordinal measures in Japanese and Taiwanese surveys). In addition, previous research has found that individuals’ subjective well-being depends on evaluation of socioeconomic status from a relative perspective rather than absolute income (Wu, Ip, & Li, 2012). We include a set of dummy variables to measure subjective evaluation of family income compared with average household: below average, average (reference category), and above average.

Finally, we include living arrangement variables. Parent-adult child coresidence is more common in Asia than in the West. Research has found that coresidence with parents or in-laws tends to lower husbands’ share in couples’ housework time (Tsuya et al., 2012). Thus, we include a dummy variable indicating coresidence with parents and/or in-laws. In addition, we control for child variables because the presence and the age of children are related to marital quality and divisions of housework (Bradbury, Fincham, & Beach, 2000; Coltrane, 2000). We include a dummy variable indicating the presence of preschool-age children, and a continuous variable to measure the total number of coresiding children under the age of 18. We also include a dummy variable indicating the presence of adult children.

**Analytical Strategy**

We use ordinary least squares (OLS) models to predict married people’s marital satisfaction in each society. As discussed above, previous studies find gender-specific effects of gender ideology and divisions of housework on marital satisfaction and document dramatic gender
differences in relative housework contributions in Asian societies. Hence, we run all the models separately by gender. Society-gender-specific models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by regions. We use `suest` command in Stata to test gender and societal differences in the coefficients across models.

Our analysis is conducted in progressive stages. First, we run models by gender and society, with the measure of divisions of housework and all the control variables. Second, we add the gender ideology variable into the previous models in order to see how the association between the division of housework and marital satisfaction changes once we control for gender ideology as well as the relationship between gender ideology and marital satisfaction. Third, to examine the moderating effect of gender ideology on links between marital satisfaction and divisions of housework, we add further interactions between relative share of housework and the gender ideology variable. This approach follows best practices outlined by Yu (2015) for both determining if variation in micro-level associations across countries is present and inferring if country-level factors help understand these patterns when comparable survey data from a small number of countries are used for cross-national research.

**RESULTS**

*Descriptive Results*

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analyses, by gender and society. Consistent with prior studies showing that wives report lower levels of marital quality than husbands (Oshio et al., 2013; Yi & Chien, 2006), we find lower average scores of marital satisfaction for women and lower percentages of women than men being satisfied or very satisfied with their marriage across four societies. Gender difference is most pronounced
in Japan: the percentage of women reporting dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their marriage is more than five times that of men, whereas the share of women who are satisfied or very satisfied with their marriage is about 24 percentage points lower than that of men. Cross-society comparisons suggest that Taiwanese men and women report the highest average level of marital satisfaction. Distributions of reports of marital satisfaction also vary by society. For example, a larger percentage of men and women in urban China than that in the other societies report being satisfied with their marriage (i.e., category 3), but the share of respondents selecting the top category is the lowest in urban China among the four societies.

(TABLE 2 INSERTED HERE)

As anticipated, compared with men and women in the other societies, China has a more equal division of housework, with men contributing 32% and women contributing 77%. By contrast, Japanese men contribute less than one-tenth of the housework, ranking last among the four societies. Both Japanese and Korean women’s share of housework is around 90%, higher than Chinese and Taiwanese women’s share (77% and 81%, respectively). Note that the sum of men’s and women’s share of housework within each society is not necessarily equal to 100%, because the share measure is based on individual respondent reports of their own and their spouses’ housework, rather than being a true “couple” level measure. Although shares of housework are more egalitarian, Chinese and Taiwanese women and men espouse a less egalitarian gender ideology than their Japanese and Korean counterparts. Men express a less egalitarian gender ideology than women, regardless of society.

The division of paid labor also appears to be more egalitarian in urban China and Taiwan than in Japan and Korea: married men in urban China and Taiwan report contributing about
two-thirds of couple’s weekly work hours, whereas those in Japan and Korea share about three-fourths of couple’s total employment hours. Note that gendered divisions of paid labor from men’s and women’s reports are more consistent in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan since men’s and women’s reports of their own share approximately add up to 100 percent, but in urban China the sum of men’s share and women’s share from their own reports exceeds 100 percent, indicating over-reporting of one’s own work hours and/or under-reporting of spouse’s work hours among urban Chinese respondents. We are, however, unable to further examine where the bias stems from by using the current data.

**Multivariate Results**

As we have described in the analytical strategy section, we run OLS regression models by gender and society. For ease of presentation, we only present coefficients of our main interest in Table 3. We include only relative share of housework and control variables in Model 1 for each gender and society group and add the gender ideology measure in Model 2. Compared with Model 1, we see very little change in the magnitude, direction, or significance level of the coefficient for relative share of housework in Model 2 within each gender and society group. The results indicate that the association between divisions of housework and marital satisfaction is not likely to be mediated through one’s own gender ideology. In addition, according to Models 2, holding gender ideology, divisions of paid work, and other control variables constant, the relative share of housework is significantly negatively associated with marital satisfaction among Japanese men, Taiwanese women, and Korean men and women. Postestimation tests indicate significant gender differences in the association between relative share of housework and marital satisfaction in Japan and Taiwan, but not in China or Korea.
Specifically, relative share of housework is not significantly associated with marital satisfaction for either men or women in urban China ($b_{men} = -0.001, p > 0.05; b_{women} = -0.001, p > 0.05$). In Japan, every 10-percentage-point increase in men’s relative share of housework is significantly associated with 0.12-point decrease in their marital satisfaction ($b = -0.012, p < 0.05$), but the negative association is much weaker and not significant among women ($b = -0.001, p > 0.05$). In Korea, every 10-percentage-point increase in their own relative share of housework is significantly associated with 0.05-point and 0.08-point decrease in men’s and women’s marital satisfaction, respectively ($b_{men} = -0.005, p < 0.01; b_{women} = -0.008, p < 0.05$). Also, the gender difference in the coefficient for relative share of housework is not statistically significant in Korea. In Taiwan, relative share of housework is not significantly associated with men’s marital satisfaction, but every 10-percentage-point increase in women’s relative share of housework is significantly associated with 0.05-point decrease in their marital satisfaction ($b = -0.005, p < 0.01$). In addition, postestimation tests also reveal cross-society variations in the association between relative share of housework and marital satisfaction: among men, it is significantly more negative in Japan and Korea than in urban China and Taiwan, with the negative relationship being most pronounced among Japanese men; among women, the relationship between relative share of housework and marital satisfaction is not significant in urban China, which is significantly different from the negative relationship found in Korea and Taiwan.

In contrast, gender ideology is not significantly associated with men’s or women’s marital satisfaction, except among Taiwanese women. Specifically, controlling for divisions of housework and paid labor and other variables, the marital satisfaction of least egalitarian
Taiwanese women is on average 0.414-point higher than that of most egalitarian Taiwanese women (Model 2: $b = -0.069$, $p < 0.01$, dif. $= -0.069 \times (1-7) = 0.414$).

Compared with the effect of divisions of housework on marital satisfaction, we see fewer significant effects of divisions of paid labor on marital satisfaction among the eight society-gender groups and the effect, if significant, appears to be less pronounced.

Specifically, every 10-percentage-point increase in their own relative share of couple’s total work hours is significantly associated with 0.02-point and 0.04-point decrease in Japanese men’s and Taiwanese women’s marital satisfaction, respectively (Models 2: $b_{men} = -0.002, p < 0.05$; $b_{women} = -0.004, p < 0.01$).

(TABLE 3 INSERTED HERE)

In Models 3, we test whether the relationship between relative share of housework and marital satisfaction is moderated by gender ideology. According to Greenstein (1996), we anticipate that the negative relationship between relative share of housework and marital satisfaction may be more pronounced among individuals, in particular women, who hold a more egalitarian gender ideology. This is indeed the case among Taiwanese women. To facilitate interpretation, we graph relationships between divisions of housework and marital satisfaction at varying levels of gender ideology, with other variables set at the mean, based on Model 3 for Taiwanese women. It is clear that for the least egalitarian Taiwanese women who score 1 on the gender ideology scale, relative share of housework is positively associated with their marital satisfaction ($b = 0.003$), whereas for women who hold more neutral gender ideology (i.e., score 4 on the scale) the relationship is slightly negative ($b = -0.006$) and for most egalitarian women who score 7 on the scale, their relative share of housework is more
negatively associated with their marital satisfaction ($b = -0.015$). Yet, we do not find significant moderating effect of gender ideology among other groups.

(FIGURE 1 INSERTED HERE)

In sum, consistent with our hypothesis, individuals’ relative share of housework is negatively associated with their marital satisfaction, but this negative association is only significant among Japanese and Korean men and Korean and Taiwanese women. We find evidence only in Japan for our hypothesis that negative associations between housework share and marital satisfaction are more pronounced among men than among women. As hypothesized, negative associations between housework share and marital satisfaction are stronger in Japan and Korea among men and in Korea and Taiwan among women. In East Asia, the moderating effect of gender ideology on the link between the division of housework and marital satisfaction is limited, as it is significant only among Taiwanese women.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In this paper, we use data from the 2006 East Asian Social Survey to examine the relationships between the division of household labor, gender ideology, and marital satisfaction, as well as cross-society variations in those relationships. The unique dataset makes this comparative study possible. Descriptive statistics reveal much variation in marital satisfaction, housework share, and gender ideology across gender and society. First, regardless of gender, men and women from urban China and Taiwan report higher levels of marital satisfaction than their counterparts from Japan and Korea. Additionally, women’s marital satisfaction is lower than men’s in each society. Second, women from couples in their prime working ages still shoulder a lion’s share of routine housework in the four East Asian
societies. Comparatively, the gender divisions of housework is the most egalitarian in China and the most traditional in Japan. Specifically, women have about 2.4 times, 3.4 times, 4.6 times, and 10.8 times the share of housework as men in China, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, respectively. Third, across the four societies, women hold more egalitarian gender ideology than men: women are more likely than men to disagree with gender-segregated divisions of paid work and family responsibilities. Also, Japanese and Koreans on average have more egalitarian gender ideology than Chinese and Taiwanese. The ranking of egalitarian gender ideology is positively associated with the early start and the achieved level of economic development of the society. Taken together, Japanese women experience the greatest discrepancy between their aspirations for gender equity and the actual division of labor, which might help explain their lowest level of marital satisfaction.

In addition to differences in marital satisfaction and the gender division of housework across the four East Asian societies, we find that national contexts moderate the association between divisions of housework and marital satisfaction. Specifically, we find that the association between individuals’ own share of housework and marital satisfaction is more negative in Japan and Korea among men and more negative in Korea and Taiwan among women. Indeed, negative associations between individuals’ housework share and marital satisfaction are evident only among Japanese and Korean men and among Korean and Taiwanese women. We speculate that Japanese and Korean husbands who are doing a larger share of housework have a less positive evaluation of their marriage because in these two societies incomes earned by husbands is more likely to meet family needs, cultural beliefs are less favorable towards married women’s and mothers’ employment, and long work hours
intensify work-family conflict (Cooke, 2010; Tompkins, 2011; Yu, 2009).

We do not find significant associations between housework share and marital satisfaction among Chinese women. This is consistent with prior qualitative research in urban China. In the reform era, women show growing domestic orientation and few wives view their disproportionate share of housework as unfair as long as their husbands successfully fulfill the provider role (Zuo & Bian, 2001; Zuo, 2014). Therefore, consistent with Yu and Lee’s argument (2013), although urban China appears to have achieved higher levels of gender equality in employment than the other three East Asian societies, married women show lower levels of egalitarian support for gender roles at home. Hence, increased gender equity in public spheres does not translate into a negative association between women’s housework share and their marital satisfaction, possibly because women have greater incentives to “do gender” via housework and unequal shares of household work are not perceived as unfair.

Meanwhile, although Japanese wives on average do over 90 percent of the housework, housework share does not appear to be associated with their marital satisfaction. It is possibly because Japanese women are aware of the “marriage package” when they decide to marry (Bumpass et al. 2009). In addition, most Japanese wives have to bear the burden of housework. Thus, Japanese wives may not perceive unfairness in the gendered division of housework because other women, not husbands, are used as a comparative referent.

In comparison, although Korean and Japanese women share similar barriers to gender equality in the labor market, due to the lack of part-time job opportunities in Korea, Korean wives are less likely than Japanese wives to be employed, but work much longer hours once they are employed (Choe et al., 2004). This is confirmed in our data. We run supplementary
analyses and find that 34% of Japanese wives and 46% of Korean wives are housewives. In addition, 21% and 35% of married Japanese women in our sample are employed full-time and part-time, respectively, whereas the percentages for Korean wives are 30% and 7%, respectively. Thus, compared with Japanese women, Korean wives are more likely to be housewives and less likely to work part-time. Employed Korean wives confront even greater work-family conflict once they are employed than Japanese wives, and thus their marital satisfaction is found to be affected by the share of housework they do at home. To further test our speculation, we run separate analysis for non-employed (predominantly housewives) and employed Korean wives, and we find that the negative association between women’s share of housework and their marital satisfaction is significant only among employed Korean wives ($b_{employed} = -0.009, p = 0.010$; $b_{non-employed} = -0.003, p = 0.654$). Therefore, marital satisfaction of Korean wives, in particularly that of the employed, is closely linked to the share of housework they do due to incompatible work and family roles.

In Taiwan, wives’ income is important for maintaining family standard of living and women experience fewer penalties associated with career interruptions (Yu, 2009). Thus, women may bargain with husbands to do more housework. If they are not able to bargain out of housework, Taiwanese wives’ are likely to feel less satisfied with their marriage.

We find that men’s or women’s gender ideology is not significantly associated with their marital satisfaction within any society, except that Taiwanese women with a more egalitarian gender ideology have significantly lower marital satisfaction. Additionally, the negative association between gender ideology and marital satisfaction among Taiwanese women is significant net of women’s share of housework, suggesting that besides gendered divisions of
housework, other unequal dimensions of marriage and family life also contribute to egalitarian women’s lower marital satisfaction in Taiwan.

Finally, we find significant moderating effect of gender ideology on the links between the division of housework and marital satisfaction for Taiwanese women. The result accords with prior research (Greenstein, 1996): the negative association between relative share of housework and marital satisfaction is more pronounced among women with more egalitarian gender ideology. The finding that more egalitarian gender ideology reduces marital satisfaction, and amplifies negative associations of housework share with marital satisfaction in Taiwan points to the possibility that Taiwanese wives have stronger threat points. In contrast, in the other three societies, women’s threat point is much weaker and cultural forces push towards women doing more housework. Divorce is less of an option for women in urban China than in Taiwan, despite these two societies with similar levels of gender equality in the labor market.

Comparative family research in East Asian societies is rare. Our study takes an initial step. Our findings suggest that in terms of marital satisfaction, the division of housework, and gender ideology, and the relationships between them, Mainland China and Taiwan are more similar, whereas Japan and Korea are more comparable. Relative to Japanese and Koreans, Chinese and Taiwanese enjoy higher marital satisfaction, share housework more equally between husbands and wives, and hold a less egalitarian gender ideology. The match between the division of labor and their aspirations for gender equality in marriage may contribute to Chinese’s and Taiwanese’s better marital quality. Despite the similarities of cultural backgrounds, the differing institutional arrangements contribute to different family life
experiences in these four societies. For example, the inflexible labor market in Korea makes married Korean women, particularly those who are employed, feel less satisfied with their marriage if they do a disproportionate share of housework. Also, we speculate that greater gender equality in employment in urban China lowers the costs of gender specialization at home and create more incentives for Chinese wives to “do gender” via housework.

Findings from East Asian societies exhibit both similarities and differences, compared with findings from Western countries. The gender differences largely resemble those found in Western countries (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Amato et al., 2003; Sayer, 2010): compared with men, women do more housework, are less satisfied with marriage, and hold a more egalitarian gender ideology. Although in Western countries a more egalitarian division of household labor tends to be associated with women’s increased marital satisfaction (Coltrane, 2000), we, nevertheless, find that marital satisfaction is not significantly related to gendered divisions of housework for Japanese or Chinese women. There are distinct differences in the consequences of divisions of housework for marriage between the West and the East maybe because the idea of equal divisions of household labor and spousal convergence in marital roles are not so prevalent in Asia. The similarities and differences suggest that more comparative studies will help us gain better understandings of family dynamics in different sociocultural and institutional contexts.
REFERENCES


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*Note:* The crude marriage/divorce rate is the annual number of marriages/divorces per 1,000 population. Female/male labor force participation rate is the percentage of females/males ages 15 and older that is economically active. GDP per capital is in U.S. dollars.

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Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. ref. = reference category. The relative shares of housework and work hours are based on individual respondent reports of their own and their spouses’ housework, rather than being a true “couple” level measure, so the sum of men’s average share and women’s average share does not necessarily equal 100.
Table 3. OLS Models of Marital Satisfaction, by Gender and Society

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<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative share of housework * Gender ideology</td>
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<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
<td>-0.002*</td>
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<td>-0.000</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>-0.313</td>
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<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.069**</td>
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<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.532)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relative share of housework * Gender ideology</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.003*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent’s share of couple’s total work hours</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes: Cluster standard errors are reported. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All models also include controls for couple’s total frequency of housework, age, education, health, subjective evaluation of family SES, co-residence with parents-in-laws, presence of preschool children, number of minor children in the household, presence of adult children. Full models are available upon request.

Based on Models 2, gender differences in the effects of relative share of housework are significant in Japan (p = 0.0308) and in Taiwan (p = 0.0620). Among men, the effect of relative share of housework on marital satisfaction differs from one society to another, except between urban China and Taiwan (p = 0.0010; p = 0.0617; p = 0.0414; p = 0.0011; p = 0.0498). The effects of relative share of housework on marital satisfaction among Korean and Taiwanese women are significantly different from the effect among Chinese women (p = 0.0436; p = 0.0693).

*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
Figure 1. Associations between Taiwanese Women’s Share of Housework and Marital Satisfaction, by Gender Ideology

Note: N = 367. GI = Gender Ideology; higher scores indicate more egalitarian attitudes.